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发表于 2010-5-30 12:32 AM
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deflation topic
First, Anybody interested in the topic should have a serious read on Fisher's "The debt-deflation theory of great depressions" uploaded by X'ing. The paper argues that paired diseases of over-indebtedness and deflation are far more harmful than the occurrence of a single one by stating that deflation increases "value" of debt. This is an indirect explanation since the actual dollar amount does not change.
Deflation does not come out from nowhere. It almost always caused by some stress that leads to consumption withdraw. Although not at the root of a crisis, Deflation certainly can make it harder to generate profit from business conduct. Basic business operations involve capital investment, production and distribution. The whole operation cycle takes time. Under sever deflation scenario, profit margin may be seriously reduced or even turns into negative. Without cash flow to pay down the debt, the same amount of debt suddenly becomes a much bigger burden. Hard landing with flush of bankruptcies is probably the only way out.
If you want to know more about the causes of the Great Depression, you should also read John Keynes' "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" and Milton Friedman's "A Monetary History of the United States", because Irving Fisher's debt deflation is just one of many explanations.
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
http://books.google.com/books?id ... heory+of+Employment,+Interest+and+Money&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=MP8BTMTqDoyONaDdiTw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDwQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false
A Monetary History of the United States
http://press.princeton.edu/about_pup/PUP100/book/4mFriedman.pdf
Causes of the Great Depression
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_the_Great_Depression
Keynesian explanation
British economist John Maynard Keynes in 1936 argued that there are many reasons why the self-correcting mechanisms that some economists claimed should work during a downturn may not work in practice. In his The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes introduced concepts that were intended to help explain the Great Depression. One argument for a noninterventionist policy during a recession was that if consumption fell due to savings, the savings would cause the rate of interest to fall. According to the classical economists, lower interest rates would lead to increased investment spending and demand would remain constant. However, Keynes states that there are good reasons why investment does not necessarily increase in response to a fall in the interest rate. Businesses make investments based on expectations of profit. Therefore, if a fall in consumption appears to be long-term, businesses analyzing trends will lower expectations of future sales. Therefore, the last thing they are interested in doing is investing in increasing future production, even if lower interest rates make capital inexpensive. In that case, according to Keynesians and contrary to Say's law, the economy can be thrown into a general slump.[3] This self-reinforcing dynamic is what happened to an extreme degree during the Depression, where bankruptcies were common and investment, which requires a degree of optimism, was very unlikely to occur.
[edit]Monetarist explanations
In their 1963 book "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960", Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz laid out their case for a different explanation of the Great Depression. After the Depression, the primary explanations of it tended to ignore the importance of money. However, in the monetarist view, the Depression was “in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces.”[4] In their view, the failure of the Federal Reserve to deal with the Depression was not a sign that monetary policy was impotent, but that the Federal Reserve exercised the wrong policies. They did not claim the Fed caused the depression, only that it failed to use policies that might have stopped a recession from turning into a depression.
Monetarist explanations were rejected in Samuelson's 1948 Economics, writing "Today few economists regard Federal Reserve monetary policy as a panacea for controlling the business cycle. Purely monetary factors are considered to be as much symptoms as causes, albeit symptoms with aggravating effects that should not be completely neglected."[5] However, the work of Friedman and Schwartz became dominant among mainstream economists by the 1980s, before being reconsidered by some in light of Japan's Lost Decade of the 1990s.[6] The role of monetary policy in financial crises is in active debate regarding the financial crisis of 2007–2010; see causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
Ben Bernanke, the current Chairman of the Federal Reserve, agreed with Friedman in blaming the Federal Reserve for its role in the Great Depression, and stated on Nov. 8, 2002:
"Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again." [7]
Before the 1913 establishment of the Federal Reserve, the banking system had dealt with periodic crises in the U.S. (such as in the Panic of 1907) by suspending the convertibility of deposits into currency. The system nearly collapsed in 1907 and there was an extraordinary intervention by an ad-hoc coalition assembled by J. P. Morgan. The bankers demanded in 1910-1913 a Federal Reserve to reduce this structural weakness. Friedman suggests the untested hypothesis that if a policy similar to 1907 had been followed during the banking panic at the end of 1930, perhaps this would have stopped the vicious circle of the forced liquidation of assets at depressed prices. Consequently, in his view, the banking panic of 1931, 1932, and 1933 might not have happened, just as suspension of convertibility in 1893 and 1907 had quickly ended the liquidity crises at the time.”[8] Essentially, the Great Depression, in the monetarist view, was caused by the fall of the money supply. Friedman and Schwartz write: "From the cyclical peak in August 1929 to a cyclical trough in March 1933, the stock of money fell by over a third." The result was what Friedman calls the "Great Contraction"— a period of falling income, prices, and employment caused by the choking effects of a restricted money supply. The mechanism suggested by Friedman and Schwartz was that people wanted to hold more money than the Federal Reserve was supplying. As a result people hoarded money by consuming less. This caused a contraction in employment and production since prices were not flexible enough to immediately fall. The Fed's failure was in not realizing what was happening and not taking corrective action.[9] |
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