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The
US government is trying to draw a line at Lehman on bailouts. If it
sticks with its new attitude, it marks the beginning of a financial
storm. The one-year long crisis has been slow motion, because there
hasn't been deleveraging. The financial sector debt rose from $14.8
trillion in 2Q07 to $15.9 trillion in 1Q08. A normal financial crisis
means deleveraging in the financial system. The US gov guarantee has
allowed the failing financial institutions to hold onto their assets at
fictitious valuation. If deleveraging really happens in the US, we must
ask three questions: liquidity for unwinding Lehman, re-pricing of risk
assets, and a severe economic downturn.
The market
storm now is really about liquidity worry over unwinding $600 bn of
Lehman's assets and possibly AIG's too. I don't think that the
unwinding will take down everyone. The Fed has expanded its role of the
lender of the last resort so much that it is hard to see that liquidity
problems could bring down the system like one century ago. But, the
fear factor will stick with us.
Asset repricing will
cast doubts on solvency of several financial institutions. If Lehman
sells its CDO's and other toxic assets, the prices will be market
prices, possibly quite close to zero. That could force other
institutions to mark to market. How many institutions would fail? We
don't know. Also, $70 trillion CDS's out there need to be repriced. If
Lehman bondholders take a steep haircut, it could break the phalanx of
financial institutions that are locked together by the market.
Asset
re-pricing would have a big effect on the economy. Cheap credit has
fueled the US's consumption. Credit has been cheap because the Fed has
been easy and Wall Street has created hard-to-understand products to
under-price the risk. The re-pricing means a big reduction in credit to
the US's households. The US economy could go through what happened in
Asia one decade ago: 4-5% contraction in GDP.
The US's
financial system as a whole may have negative equity, I believe. If its
leverage assets depreciate 10%, it doesn't have equity anymore. The
US's financial system is too leveraged to sustain a significant drop in
asset prices. The financial sector's leverage is 137% of GDP compared
in 2007 to 100% five years ago and 70% ten years ago. We can argue if
leverage should go back to 100% or 70%. The figure is probably between
the two. The amount of deleveraging, hence, is over $6 trillion, ten
times Lehman's unwinding. That much deleveraging could mean a major
reduction in asset prices. But, the US's financial system is too
leveraged to sustain a major reduction in asset prices. It may mean the
whole financial system is bankrupt.
There are two ways
to deal with a financial crisis. The right approach is to let market
clear and establish liquid market for bad assets. Markets and economies
bottom quickly. That is what happened in Asia ten years ago. The
alternative is to hoard bad assets and to allow financial institutions
recover slowly from accumulating profits to offset the hidden losses.
So far, the US has been on the second path like Japan 15 years ago. The
difference is that the US has inflation and Japan deflation due to the
US's trade deficit or low savings rate.
Allowing
Lehman to fail seems to indicate that the US government wants a market
solution. I'm not convinced. The amount of deleveraging is too big for
market to swallow. The US gov may be back to the bailout circuit again.
Would they let AIG fail? If they bail out AIG, we are back to where it
was.
The bottom line: the only solution for the US is
to print money to cover up liquidity problems at financial institutions
and let them sort out their losses overtime. The market implications
are sell dollar, buy gold. |
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